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This paper presents a synoptic interpretation of structural unemployment in
Europe. The paper consists of three parts. Part 1 summarises some major
stilysed facts of the record and the state of unemployment in Europe. In part 2,
these facts are taken as the basis for a theoretical interpretation of the genesis
and persistence of European unemployment. Part 3 contains policy conclusions.
The main message of the paper is that the ultimate cause of European
unemployment since the early 1980s is to be found in the path and pattern of
structural change within an institutional framework that prevents a sufficient
degree of structural wage flexibility to come about.
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0. Introduction
This paper is the opening statement in a conference on European Labour Markets.
As such, it is bound to take a broad view and to lay the ground for further discus-
sion during the day. With this task in mind, I will refrain from presenting any
piece of original research that would necessarily divert the focus on some rather
narrowly defined technical subject. I will rather try to make a rough-and-ready
stocktaking of what the profession knows about structural or non-cyclical unem-
ployment in Europe and what, on the basis of this knowledge, can or should be
done about it.
The paper has three parts. In part 1,1 summarise what I consider to be some ma-
jor stylised facts of the record and the state of unemployment in Europe. In part 2,
I take these facts as the basis for a couple of more or less controversial stories
about the genesis and persistence of unemployment. In part 3, I draw a very
subjective policy conclusion.!
Note that, if not otherwise specified, I will use the term 'Europe' in the meaning of OECD-
Europe, meaning all European countries which are members of the OECD and which may,
but need not be members of the European Community. This use of terminology has to be
qualified in three respects, (i) Within the OECD, the focus will be on what may be called the
'rich core'-nations, leaving aside countries like Turkey, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and also
Spain that have been (and still are) laggards in terms of economic development. In many as-
pects, their labour markets are not yet comparable to those of the 'mature' industrial core
countries. In addition, they tend to have a rather poor data base, at least for the purpose of
long-term analysis, (ii) Very small countries such as Iceland and Luxembourg are also left
aside, not because they are not per se interesting, but because they tend to be too idiosyn-
cratic, resembling in economic terms metropolitan areas rather than countries, (iii) Eastern
Gercpany is left out because its (post-communist) labour market can only be analysed in a
wider setting that covers other transformation economies as well. When speaking of Ger-
many, we therefore mean western Germany or former West Germany.-2-
1. Stylised Facts and Evidence
With some courageous simplifications, the major characteristics of European la-
bour markets can be summarised in ten stylised facts, some of them straight ob-
servations, others more complex pieces of empirical evidence that have been
gathered and developed in many different individual studies of labour economists
and others.
2
Fact 1: By post-war historical standards, unemployment in Europe is high.
This is a completely uncontroversial empirical statement that can be supported by
a glance over Table I,
3 which divides the post-war period 1950-94 into four rea-
sonably defined subperiods: 1950-59, 1960-73, 1974-82 and 1983-94. For all
four periods, we are given the average unemployment rate for 16 countries,
calculated as the period average of the annual OECD-standardised rate or its
historical equivalent as presented by Maddison (1991). All 12 European countries
experienced a rise of the unemployment rate from 1974/82 to 1983/94, the
European average went up from 4.6 to 7.0 per cent. A rise of comparable
magnitude in absolute terms - from 1.9 to 4.6 per cent - had already taken place
from 1960-73 to 1974-82.
Most of the relevant data on these more complex facts can be found in the issues of the
OECD Employment Outlook (1993ff) and the OECD Jobs Study (1994).
For the annual data that underlie the following tables, see Table Al in the appendix.-3-



























































































Source: Maddison (1991), pp. 262-265, Table C6 (see Appendix-Table Al),
1990-94 OECD Employment Outlook 1995, p. 216, Table 1.-4-
Note that, except in Australia, nothing comparably dramatic happened in the in-
dustrialised world outside Europe. The US-experience is particularly striking: the
US-unemployment rate - which used to be 'traditionally higher' than most
European rates due to the relatively high turnover and thus high frictional
unemployment in American labour markets - rose only moderately, from about 5
per cent in 1960-73 to about 7 percent in 1974-94.
Fact 2: Since roughly 1983, unemployment in Europe has remained high, but
did not increase anymore, at least not systematically. However, there were dif-
ferentiated national developments, which do reveal a certain geographic pat-
tern.
The first part of this fact may be surprising at least to those listening to the recur-
rent tune of the current policy debate in some European countries, notably in
Germany, where politicians and journalists like to emphasise that the plight of the
labour market has reached a historic peak and that things have become worse and
worse over time. On average, this is simply not true for the last 10-12 years, as
the numbers in Table 2 indicate: comparing 1994 and 1983 - both years with
similar cyclical conditions (end of recession/beginning of recovery), unemploy-
ment was lower in 1994 than in 1983 for five countries and higher for six ones,
with one country (Austria) experiencing virtually no change. The 'good' perform-
ers are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom,
the 'bad' performers Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.-5-





















































































Source: Maddison (1991), pp. 262-265, Table C6, 1990-94 OECD Employment
Outlook 1995, p. 216, Table 1.-6-
To be sure, this picture does not look random, and - with a glance to the unem-
ployment rates in the interim year 1989 - one is inclined to divide Europe into
three 'performance groups': Scandinavia, which experienced a dramatic worsen-
ing after 1989, notably in Finland and Sweden; the Romanic countries (France,
Italy), which experienced a gradual worsening all throughout; and the rest
(leaving out Austria and Switzerland), which experienced some improvement,
very moderate in Denmark and western Germany, more substantial in Belgium,
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Whatever the statistical details may be, it must be recognised that, for most Euro-
pean countries, the period since 1983 should not be regarded as a straight con-
tinuation of a long-term trend towards ever increasing unemployment. The only
two countries where such an interpretation may make sense are France and Italy,
but even the moderate increase in these countries is a long way off the sharp rise
of earlier years.
Why is this fact overlooked in the public? Probably because, in the 'public mind'
of most countries, the cyclical improvement around the turn of the decades has
simply been interpreted as defining a new point of reference for unemployment,
and from there, the following worsening looks dramatic indeed. Western Ger-
many is a most obvious case in point: by 1991, the unemployment rate came
down to 4.2 per cent, a drastic improvement vis-a-vis 1983, but maybe a cycli-
cally unsustainable level. Today, the public recognises the worsening from this
point, but there is so far no indication that this worsening leads to another step-
wise increase of the (cyclically adjusted) unemployment rate to a new historical
peak as it happened in the mid-1970s and early 1980s.-7-
Fact 3: Since roughly 1983, a relatively high share of unemployment is long-
term. Though high, this share has not systematically increased over time.
Hence European labour markets can be considered as strongly dualized, but
not to an increasing extent.
This fact is directly complementary to Fact 2: parallel to the increase of the rate
of unemployment in the mid 1970s and early 1980s, the share of long-term unem-
ployed persons increased dramatically, and remained high ever since. Table 3
shows the relevant numbers: all European countries except Denmark, Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland have a high share of long-term in total unemployment,
usually 30-50 percent, if long-term is defined as uncompleted spells longer than
12 months (as is done in the table). By and large, these shares have remained
within the same magnitude between 1983 and 1993, although there are some
minor exceptions.
In any event, the difference to North America is striking: both in the United States
and in Canada, the share of long-term unemployment - how ever defined - is to-
day very low, even considerably lower than it was in 1983. Clearly, the dualiza-
tion of the labour market in 'active job searchers' and long-term unemployed per-
sons is a European phenomenon.
Fact 4: Employment grew faster in most European countries in the decade
after than in the decade before 1983, though generally slower than in the
industrialised world outside Europe. Employment growth since 1983 has been
quite different across European countries, with differences roughly reflecting
the geographical pattern of the unemployment record over time.-8-



















































* Long-term unemployment defined as those unemployed persons that have been
unemployed ('uncompleted unemployment spell') for 12 months or above.
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1995, p. 219, Table Q.-9-
By historical standards, the time since 1983 has been a period of quite fast em-
ployment growth in Europe (see Table 4). In all countries except the Scandina-
vian ones and Italy, employment grew faster in 1983-93 than in 1973-83. On av-
erage, the growth rate of employment was about as high as in the 1960s (0.6 per
cent p.a.) and not so much lower than in the 1950s (then 0.8 p.a.).
This is, once again, a stylised fact that runs counter to popular wisdom, which
likes to dwell on ideas of increasingly jobless growth. In a sense, the idea of
'jobless growth' in Europe is not only misplaced, but turns the facts upside down.
This can be seen from the numbers of output, employment and productivity
growth put together in Table 4. In all European countries, output (GDP in con-
stant prices) rose slower before than after 1973; the average in the Table
indicates a slowdown from 4.6 per cent p.a. in both 1950-60 and 1960-73 to 2
per cent in both 1973-83 and 1983-93. Remarkably enough, this slowdown of
output growth did not go along with a corresponding slowdown of employment
growth, which turned out to be equally fast in 1983-93 as in the 'golden' period
1960-73. The corollary of this statement is that the slowdown of GDP per worker
(in constant prices) was particularly dramatic, down from 4 per cent in 1960-73
to 1.5 per cent in 1983-93. Clearly, this is not a stylised picture of 'jobless
growth', but exactly the opposite, say, 'growthless employment expansion',
meaning poor productivity increases going along with robust employment
expansion.
To be sure, employment grew slower in the 1980s in Europe than it did overseas,
notably in North America and Australia. But this difference is not really a new
phenomenon: in all four periods that are shown in Table 4, North America and-10-













































































































































































































































* compound growth rates per annum; output defined as GDP at constant prices.
**1983-92
Source:0£C£> Economic Outlook 58 (December 1995); OECD Employment Outlook, July 1995; Maddison (1981), various tables.-11-
Australia had much faster employment growth (and likewise slower labour pro-
ductivity growth) than the European average.
Most remarkable is the difference of employment growth performance between
the various European countries in the period 1983-93, which runs roughly parallel
to the record of unemployment decline: by and large, the countries with high em-
ployment growth were also the ones with declining unemployment rates.
4 The
most conspicuous case is the one of the Netherlands, were employment grew by a
hefty 3.2 per cent p.a., faster than output and thus implying a decline of average
output per worker.
Fact 5: In most European countries, part-time employment has grown faster
than full-time employment. Part-time employment varies widely across coun-
tries, but neither its extent nor its change over time can account for much of
the international differences in employment growth.
Table 5 presents the relevant statistical information: in all European countries
except the Scandinavian ones (where it is traditionally high), the share of part-
time in total employment increased substantially between 1983 and 1994, as it
had mostly done in the ten-year period before. However, even by 1994, the na-
tional differences remained quite dramatic: roughly speaking, the 'north-western'
countries of Europe had shares well above 20 percent, the 'central' countries
For the 12 European countries in the period 1983-93, the correlation coefficient between
the growth rate of employment and the percentage point decrease of unemployment is 0.85;
excluding the three Scandinavian countries Norway, Sweden and Finland, it is 0.67.-12-








































































































Source: OECD Employment Outlook, pp. 210-11, Table E.-13 - for \ Kiel
(including France, but excluding Switzerland) around 10-15 per cent and Finland
and Italy below 10 per cent. By and large, part-time employment remains the do-
main of the female labour force in most countries, though the share of part-time
working men did surpass a (not insignificant) 7 per cent in half of the 12 coun-
tries.
If one excludes the Scandinavian countries from consideration, there appears to
be some correlation between the share of part-time employment and the decline
of unemployment in the period 1983-93 (Table 2), with the outstanding cases
being the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom. With a view to
overseas, this impression is reinforced because the part-time share is traditionally
high in the US, and so is employment growth. However, the link is far from clear-
cut: after all, neither the US nor the UK did experience a particularly strong
increase of the part-time share in the last ten years, and the increase of the Dutch
share is in part a statistical illusion due to changes in survey methodology. In any
case, correcting the Dutch figure of employment growth in Table 4 (3.2 per cent
p.a.) for the shortening of working hours due mainly to the rise of part-time work
cuts it down to 2.3 per cent p.a., still a very fast growth.
5
In the Netherlands, average hours worked per person in employment and per year declined
by 0.9 per cent p.a. in the period 1983-93. See OECD Employment Outlook 1995, p. 208,
Table C.-14-
Fact 6: Among the European countries, there is a link between the degree to
which industry shrank in the 1970s and 1980s and the development of unem-
ployment: the more powerful the de-industrialisation, the more dramatic the
subsequent worsening of the unemployment record.
The link between unemployment and de-industrialisation can roughly be appre-
ciated by looking at Table 2 together with Table 6; the former shows (i.a.) unem-
ployment rates in the years 1973, 1983 and 1994, the latter the employment share
of industry and the level of industrial employment for the years 1973, 1983 and
1993. In the period 1973-83, it was only one specific group of countries - Nor-
way, Sweden and Switzerland - which succeeded in keeping unemployment
roughly constant despite a sharply decreasing share (and absolute level) of indus-
trial employment. (The Nordic countries achieved this by heavily expanding the
public sector, Switzerland by almost perfectly adjusting the labour force via mi-
gration.) If these are excluded, the correlation coefficient between the absolute
change of the employment share of industry and of the unemployment rate is
highly negative, -0.87 for all and -0.85 for the European countries.
6
For the period 1983-93, the statistical link is somewhat weaker, but it still sur-
vives, with the respective correlation coefficients being -0.57 and -0.65. For this
period, however, it is not anymore Norway, Sweden and Switzerland that
succeed in cutting the link,
7 but rather those countries outside and inside Europe
Always excluding Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. If these are included, the respective
correlation coefficients are -0.46 and -0.32 respectively.
Including or excluding the three countries does hardly affect the relevant correlation
coefficient.-15-






































































































































Source: OECD Emplyoment Outlook, p. 209. Table D.-16-
that are known for their particularly fast growth of employment in the service
sector, notably the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.
Note that the 'speed' of structural change away from industry did on average
slow down between the two periods under consideration, in Europe as a whole,
but also in North America and Australia. This is not surprising because the period
1973-83 contains the two major oil-price shocks, which hit industry much harder
than the service sector.
Fact 7: Since the early 1980s, there has been a (non-cyclical) downward ad-
justment of aggregate labour cost in real terms, i.e. the producer wage deflated
by labour productivity, in virtually all European countries. Whatever its cause,
this wage adjustment is likely to have been one of the major reasons why em-
ployment grew fast by historical standards.
It is a robust econometric finding that, unlike (parts of) the two preceding
decades, the 1980s and early 1990s have not been a time of 'aggressive wage
policies' that systematically cut into profit margins. To the contrary: wage levels
rose only moderately, even after the threat of further job losses had abated in the
wake of the recessions 1981-83 and 1991-93. From the mid-1980s, the wage
restraint paved the ground in most countries for a gradual, but sustained
employment expansion, and a similar situation may emerge in the near future.
This simple fact raises obvious questions about those prominent theories of Euro-
pean unemployment that focus on whatever sort of rigidity of the wage level as
the main cause of unemployment, be it in the form insider/outsider-behaviour or
efficiency wage setting. Apparently, collective wage agreements by unions and-17-
employers did not systematically disregard the interests of outsiders, but allowed
a good part of them to find jobs and thus also to exert a moderating influence on
future wage claims. The most striking example for this is the West German labour
market where a large number of labour market entrants with no apparent insider
voice at all (baby boom youngsters, immigrants) was newly employed, a situation
which resembled the integration of ethnic German refugees in the 1950s.
Fact 8: Since the early 1980s, there has been a shift of labour demand
(relative to labour supply) to the disadvantage of low-skilled labour, which
showed up in widening differentials between skill groups either of earnings or
of unemployment rates, depending on whether collective agreements and
welfare state provisions allowed for increasing wage differentiation or not.
This is a robust empirical finding, which is mainly based on the different labour
market developments in North America and Continental Europe. In the United
States - the prototype of a country with strongly decentralised wage bargaining
and only modest unemployment support - the ratio of unemployment rates
between high-skilled and low-skilled workers remained roughly constant, but the
earnings differential widened considerably; low-paid workers faced an actual
decline of their real wages by more than one percent per annum. Canada and
Australia had a similar, though somewhat less dramatic experience.
In continental Europe, where virtually all countries have more extensive unem-
ployment support systems and usually more centralised collective bargaining than
the US, the development was exactly the reverse. In most countries, low-paid
workers saw their wages increase at average growth rates so that wage differen--18-
tiation between skill groups remained roughly constant. In turn, unemployment of
low-skilled workers - and long-term unemployment in particular - increased dis-
proportionally. A special case is the United Kingdom, which to some extent
combined the worst of both worlds: a dispropotionate increase of unemployment
of low-skilled workers and a widening of wage differentials, though not yet a real
wage decline of low-paid workers.
Fact 9: Except in countries with highly-developed apprenticeship systems such
as Austria and Germany, youth unemployment rates tend to be considerably
higher than average unemployment rates. However, in many European coun-
tries, the gap has narrowed in the course of the 1980s.
While the first part of this observation is widely known and much deplored as a
major labour market problem in many countries, the quite considerable improve-
ment in the situation since the early 1980s has gone largely unnoticed. E.g., in the
United Kingdom and France, two countries with otherwise very different labour
market records, the ratio of the unemployment rate of persons of age under 20
years to the average unemployment rate has come down since 1983 from about 4
to 1.5 and 5 to 2.5 respectively. For persons between 20 and 25 years, the
relative improvement has been less marked in most European countries, but still
visible in the data.
One important reason for these improvements is likely to be found on the labour
supply side: the baby boom generation has by now grown older, and the much
smaller cohort of newcomers that follows is - in quantitative terms - a smaller
burden to the labour market.-19-
Fact 10: In many European countries, there has been a marked upward trend
of unemployment - and of long-term unemployment in particular - among eld-
erly workers relative to the rest of the labour force.
This well-confirmed observation
8 suggests that there may be more to the change
of the generational incidence of unemployment than mere labour supply effects.
Apparently, elderly workers have an increasingly important competitive disadvan-
tage vis-a-vis other age groups with respect to re-employment prospects. As eld-
erly persons tend to have more 'scleroticized' human capital than younger ones,
this points towards structural flexibility as being an increasingly important de-
terminant of the probability of unemployment exit.
2. Stylised Interpretations
In the light of the facts.summarised above, the basic nature of European unem-
ployment is not very difficult to identify, though a lot of minor puzzles remain
unsolved. From a bird's-eye view and with the benefit of hindsight, one may tell
the story along the following broad lines.
8 it is particularly relevant for western Germany where an ever increasing share of long-term
unemployed persons (in the early 1990s: roughly 40 per cent) had an age of 55 years or
above.-20-
• Genesis of the Evil
The year 1973 and the subsequent ten-year interim period up to 1983 mark a wa-
tershed in the labour market history of Europe. Until that time, structural change
proceeded in virtually all countries without any dramatic shrinkage of industrial
employment, though in most countries with a continuously declining share of
industry in total employment.
9 Between 1973 and 1983, industrial employment
shrank in two major swings, following the oil price shocks and the concomitant
recessions.
The significance of these events can hardly be overestimated, and it is worth re-
calling it at a time when this transitional period is beginning to be quietly shelved
in the public mind as a part of long-past dusty history. For whatever precise eco-
nomic reason, the quite abrupt, but apparently irreversible 'amputation' of a part
of industry changed the structural characteristics of labour markets for a very long
time, maybe for good. Since then, the standard European country has much higher
equilibrium unemployment and a persistently dualized labour market with a high
share of long-term unemployed persons.
Note that, at the time, there were four types of countries in the industrialised
world that could at least partially avoid these unfortunate developments. First,
there were those countries which, for different reasons, did not really go through
a large-scale de-industrialisation: in Europe Austria and Finland, and outside
The partial exception was Germany where - due to a long-standing currency undervaluation
within the Bretton-Woods system - the strongly export-oriented manufacturing sector could
even increase employment in relative terms until the mid-1960s. This helped to reduce the
equilibrium unemployment rate even below the (low) levels of other countries, but made the
relative rise afterwards all the more dramatic.-21-
Europe Japan. Second, there were the 'classical' Scandinavian countries Norway
and Sweden, which met the shrinkage of industry with a large-scale expansion of
the public sector and, in the case of Sweden, with macroeconomic attempts to
insulate the country from the world-wide slump by devaluing the currency. Third,
there were the United States, Canada and Australia, which experienced a fast
growth of the service sector, including its low-pay low-producitivity segments,
which helped to mitigate - though not altogether prevent - the rise in unemploy-
ment. And finally, there was Switzerland, which 'solved' the problem by regulat-
ing migration streams and thus almost perfectly adjusting the labour supply.
Note also that not all these 'model cases' have proved sustainable over time.
During the later 1980s and early 1990s, Finland, Sweden and to a much lesser
extent Switzerland went through adjustment crises, which led to a rise of unem-
ployment that, in the end, appears to be comparable to what happened before in
the rest of Europe. And even Japan is currently going through its first post-war
wave of de-industrialisation, and it looks likely that it will end up with signifi-
cantly higher (open or hidden) underemployment than before. 1°
10 Of all European countries, the cases of Norway and Austria may come closest to a still-not-
falsified success story: they started off as low-unemployment countries in 1973, and they
still are today. For both countries, however, one has to be careful about interpreting the
record. Norway is by far the richest European OECD-country in terms of per-capita natural
resources, and it could rather easily afford an expansion of its public sector, which proved
unsustainable in the case of neighbouring, but resource-poor Sweden. Austria may not be
much different from southern Germany in terms of its industrial structure and
unemployment record so that the statistically visible success may be to some extent a matter
of 'geographical aggregation'.-22-
• Persistence of the Evil
For a long time in the 1980s, the policy discussion focused on the question
whether and to what extent a more expansionary macroeconomic stance could
help to reduce unemployment in Europe. This led to the fascinating question
whether long-term unemployment was path dependent ('hysteretic') in the sense
that long unemployment spells were themselves the ultimate reason for the duali-
zation, or whether there were - visible or hidden - structural characteristics that
made long-term unemployed persons hard to re-employ.
1
1 If hysteresis was
dominant, a deliberate macro-expansion made much sense; if structural factors
dominated, the main cures would have to be found on the micro side. As often in
empirical research, the answers remained inconclusive: some microeconometric
studies pointed towards an important role of path dependence, but a wealth of
descriptive facts - some of them enumerated above in Section 1 - appeared to un-
derline the importance of genuine structural factors.
In the short or medium run, history gave some support to the hysteresis side of
the argument: the world-wide business upswing in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
further fuelled in Europe by the 'German unification boom', proved more power-
ful than expected in reducing unemployment and also to some extent long-term
unemployment. But the impact was temporary: the cyclical industrial expansion
could not be turned into permanent industrial growth, and in the course of the
subsequent recession, unemployment - and long-term unemployment - rose again
to the prior levels (or beyond) in most places.
1
1 For a survey of this debate as, see Layard, Nickell, Jackman (1991), pp. 256-266.-23-
By now, the controversy has largely died down because the long-term structural
factors seem to have gained the upper hand.
1
2 And very few economists would
still place much faith into a policy strategy that focuses on deliberate macro-
economic expansion as the major weapon against European unemployment. It is
now widely accepted that, apart from a cyclical margin, which we have of course
difficulties to quantify, we do observe equilibrium unemployment rates that
reflect structural change in the world economy and the institutional characteristics
of the labour market.
A typical interpretation of persistent structural unemployment in Europe, which




The industrial shrinkage in the period 1973-83 wiped out a part of the capital
stock that was complementary to the European labour force. In the subsequent
process of queueing for work at a smaller capital stock, those workers with better
characteristics were re-integrated whereas the others were sorted out. This
process continued until a new flow equilibrium was reached; and this equilibrium
was, quite naturally, a dualised labour market in which outsiders were
increasingly frustrated by unsuccessful rounds of job search. The powerful
cyclical recovery that began towards the end of the 1980s improved prospects -
by raising the utilisation of the existing capital stock and by enlarging this very
stock - but the improvement turned out unsustainable and another round of
1^ In my view, there are also major theoretical arguments in favour of the structural in-
terpretation. See Paque (1995), S. 186-191.
1
3 I have presented the following interpretation elsewhere, notably in Paque (1994,1995).-24-
'screening out' took place in the labour market, leading back to the pre-boom
dimension of underemployment and labour market dualization.
From an economy-wide standpoint, this is a story of many 'good' outsiders and a
smaller number of 'bad' ones, with the former tending to find their way into em-
ployment without going through long spells of joblessness (notwithstanding the
dominance of insider interests in collective bargaining!) and the latter ending up
in states of long-term unemployment. Then, of course, the question arises: who
are the 'good ones' and who the 'bad ones'?
Once again, the key to the answer may lie in the trend change of industrial em-
ployment: while the brunt of the job losses in the period 1973-83 hit industrial
workers disproportionately, the subsequent (net) employment growth took place
in service sectors. If industry is on average the sector that pays the highest 'pre-
mium' on physical work, this structural change meant a devaluation of the market
value of unskilled labour and of everything in workers' skills that is sector-spe-
cific to industry. If, in addition, there was a trend towards 'servicification' in in-
dustry itself - meaning that physical routine work is replaced by machine activity,
which is supervised and serviced by a smaller number of better-skilled workers -
then the respective devaluation becomes even more dramatic. Data on changes of
employment disaggregated by skill levels and branches of economic activity





4 See for the case of West Germany, Paque (1995), p. 173, Tab. 1.-25-
Given these trends, there are likely to be 'good' outsiders and 'bad' outsiders. The
good ones are typically those who have an up-to-date vocational qualification or
training, preferably in a professional service job, who are newcomers (and thus
do not yet carry the 'scars' of industrial work), and who can be expected to adjust
flexibly and with high motivation to the new working environment. In turn, for-
mer industrial workers are at a competitive disadvantage, in particular when they
are older or physically handicapped or have no formal qualification. Also, they
tend to have higher reservation wages because they held a rather well-paid indus-
trial job before and because they are granted more generous support by unem-
ployment benefit systems, which make notably the duration of benefit payments
depend on the accumulated length of all prior spells of employment.
In most continental European countries, these trends in the labour market did not
lead to a corresponding wage differentiation that might have eased the re-integra-
tion of the disadvantaged outsiders. In particular, there has not been any widening
of the wage gap between high-skill and low-skill workers as it could be observed
in the United States, Canada and Australia and to some extent the United King-
dom (see Fact 8 above). The deep reason for the high degree of structural wage
rigidity in continental Europe is still a matter of speculation, and it may well differ
between individual countries. However, it is evident that the sample of
industrialised nations which did experience greater wage differentiation does also
share some common - and suggestive - characteristics: relatively decentralised
wage bargaining, a relatively restrictive system of unemployment benefits, and
- except for the United Kingdom - a highly elastic labour supply of unskilled
workers due to immigration. Thus it is plausible to suspect that, in the continental
European countries, the existence of some sort of minimum wage floor - through
collective agreements and, in the last resort, through welfare benefits - prevented-26-
the required differentiation of the wage structure to come about. (Note that, in the
absence of a large-scale inflow of low-skilled workers, the market requirement
for differentiation would probably have been much more moderate than in
classical immigration countries like the United States, Canada and Australia.)
So much for the basic story of unemployment persistence in Europe. It is impor-
tant to realise that this is, first and foremost, a story of persistence, not one of
further increase: by and large, European labour markets were flexible enough to
digest the normal pace and pattern of structural change as it took place in the pe-
riod 1983-1994 without a further increase of equilibrium unemployment. Two
elements of adjustment proved quite powerful in this respect: the 'natural' ex-
change of generations - older, on average less skilled workers leaving and
younger, on average more skilled workers entering the labour force
1
5 -, and the
considerable flexibility of the wage level that could be widely observed across
Europe for most of the relevant period and which helped employment to expand
quite fast (see Facts 4 and 7 above). Hence there is no evidence for the 'European
model' of collective bargaining plus welfare stated to have worked badly all
throughout normal conditions of structural change. However, there is evidence
that this model was unable to cope with the long-term consequences of more
dramatic waves of de-industrialisation: such waves appear to leave structural
traces in the labour market that call for adjustments which go beyond the capacity
of the system.
1
5 See again Paqu6 (1995), p. 173, Tab. 1, for quantitative evidence on this point for the case
of West Germany.
1
6 See Emerson (1988).-27-
To be more specific: European labour markets work reasonably well as long as
there are no dramatic pressures of structural change that pull in a non-egalitarian
direction. Unfortunately, the waves of de-industrialisation of the 1970s and 1980s
had in the longer run precisely such non-egalitarian consequences, calling e.g. for
a wage differentiation between skill groups, for a downward correction of the pay
for older workers, etc. This did not happen, and so equilibrium unemployment
rose, maybe for good. But the subsequent pressures of labour supply growth and
structural change of labour demand at a 'normal' pace could be accommodated
with 'normal' means.
So much for the general diagnosis, which appears to be relevant for basically all
European countries. The emerging significant national differences in labour mar-
ket developments are harder to explain, and many puzzles remain. On top of
these stands the 'employment miracle' of the Netherlands (see Table 4), which
virtually no observer would have forecast at the beginning of the period.
Apparently, the Netherlands have managed to have a very fast growth of jobs in
the low-productivity segment of the economy, faster even than the United States;
and this growth turned the Netherlands from a high- into a low unemployment
economy by European standards, though it did not mean that the country could
return to the rates of joblessness that prevailed in the 1960s and early 1970s. Be
that as it may, the case remains somewhat mysterious.
Other comparative performances are easier to explain. Especially the largest
countries - Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy - fit rather nicely into
the general pattern. All four had roughly the same trend increase of labour
productivity (1.6-1.7 per cent) so that the national differences of employment
growth can be accounted for by the differences of output growth - highest in-28-
Germany followed with a distance by the United Kingdom, Italy and France. For
the former two, this meant a moderate decrease, for the latter two a moderate
increase of equilibrium unemployment. The specific 'Romanic' problem of still
rising unemployment after 1983 thus shrinks to a general problem of economic
growth, which may well be dominated by issues outside the labour market.
• Future of the Evil: Speculative Thoughts
If one searches for the deeper 'exogenous' reasons for the devaluation of unskilled
labour in virtually all industrialised countries over the last two decades, two
major forces come to mind: globalization and technological progress. The
former means that a growing group of newly industrialised and developing
countries reached a level of industrialisation, technical standards and labour skills
that made them successfully compete in the markets for labour- and (physical)
capital-intensive production and increasingly also in the lower market segments
of human-capital intensive goods. The latter means that technological progress in
industry has been labour-saving in the sense that it remained persistently
profitable to replace manpower by modern (physical) capital equipment. Which
of the two forces dominated so far is a matter of dispute,
1
7 which appears to be
most relevant for some major issues of trade policy vis-a-vis the Third World, but
much less so for a speculative assessment of future trends in the labour market.
After all, the speed and the shape of technological progress is itself to a large
extent the (endogenous) outcome of a competitive race on all
levels - encompassing growing intra-industry trade within and between industrial
1
7 See, e.g., the summary assessments in the OECD Jobs Study (1994), Chapters 3 and 4, pp.
77-168.-29-
countries as well as growing inter-industry trade between industrial and
developing countries. Hence the process of globalization in a broader sense
- meaning the world-wide trend towards the integration of product and service
markets, which in turn is fuelled by the (technology-induced) decline of
transportation and communication costs - may well be the right driving force to
be identified behind the secular changes in virtually all labour markets of western
industrial countries.
For the future, it is hard to imagine a change or a significant slowdown of this
trend towards globalization in the broadest sense, not least because major popula-
tion giants of the Third World - notably China and India - are now embarking on
the way that a few much smaller Asian countries have gone through during the
last three decades. Hence the process may well speed up and further accentuate
structural change in the rich countries.
Beyond this very general trend, however, we know very little. In particular, we
have virtually no idea whether structural change may return to anything like the
dramatic industrial shrinkage that happened in the period 1973-83, or continue to
follow the much more moderate and smooth path that could be observed over the
more recent period since 1983. In the former case, a further ratcheting-up of
European unemployment rates would be much more likely than in the latter. Sure
enough, dramatic supply shocks like the oil-price hikes in two decades ago
appear to be much less likely today. But history has a habit of taking economists,
politicians and the public by surprise as to the ultimate causes and time-series
structure of 'shocks'.-30-
3. Ideas on Policy
How could Europe improve its unemployment record? Once again with a coura-
geous simplification, one m?y distinguish two ways to achieve this: (i) more em-
ployment through faster economic growth and (ii) more employment at any given
growth path.
As to the first way, past experience has clearly shown that economic growth is far
from jobless, provided that collective wage agreements do not systematically
strangle its employment effects. Hence a policy stance that is good for economic
growth should also be good as a means to fight unemployment. What such a
policy stance might entail is a vast subject, which we cannot tackle in this paper.
To some extent, leaving it aside is justified because past experience also shows
that even a forceful growth push with considerable employment expansion is no
sufficient cure for the dualization of the labour market in 'high-productivity
insiders' and 'low-productivity outsiders': e.g., even after the unification boom
had run its course in Germany, unemployment remained much higher than it was
two decades earlier.
Therefore, we focus on the second way: more employment at a given growth
path. In this respect, the starting-point for any policy reform proposal should be
the recognition that those countries which have been rather successful in reducing
unemployment and avoiding or at least mitigating a dualization of their labour
markets did allow a low-productivity segment to grow in their economies. In fact,
there is nothing in the statistical picture of the industrialised world which may
suggest that unemployment - and notably long-term unemployment - could be
reduced without some significant growth of low wage employment.-31-
Given this fact, the core question for a prototype European government may be-
come: How can we allow a low-productivity segment to grow without undermin-
ing what may be called the philosophy of our 'European Model' of the welfare
state? If one of the core principles of this philosophy can be seen in providing all
citizens who have lost their job with a minimum of subsistence that is not intol-
erably far below their prior standard of living, then a kind of minimalist reform of
the system may take about the following shape.
1
8
As ever, unemployed persons receive unemployment benefits (contribution- or
tax-financed), with replacement ratios as they apply today. For a first stage of
unemployment (say, one year), the criteria of acceptability of job offers remain
the same as in most current systems in Europe, i.e. the unemployed person is still
free to search exclusively 'in the neighbourhood' of his/her prior wage and work-
ing conditions and to turn down any offers of jobs with substantially inferior re-
muneration. If still unemployed after the first stage, the person is still entitled to
receive unemployment support, again with today's replacement ratios applying.
However, he/she is not entitled anymore to turn down any emerging job offer at
whatever wage, provided he/she is physically able to do the job. On the other
hand, he/she is entitled to receive financial compensation for any net income loss
incurred by accepting a job: if the wage of the job is below the level of unem-
ployment aid he/she obtains at the time of the offer, the person receives a gov-
ernment matching grant that makes up the difference, preferably even somewhat
181 nave developed the following reform proposal in somewhat more detail elsewhere (see, e.g., Paqu6 1994, pp. 19-28). Note that the proposal was originally designed with the
institutional setting of Germany in mind. However, as it is presented here, it is likely to be
applicable to other European countries as well.-32-
more to give the person a stronger incentive to include lower wage jobs into
his/her range of search.
The rationale of this matching grant is basically the same as the idea of various
employment subsidy schemes that have recently been put forward:
1
9 if the phi-
losophy of the welfare state requires that part of the devaluation of manpower and
human capital in the course of structural change is to be socialised, then it should
be done by subsidising states of employment and not states of (long-term) unem-
ployment.
There are basically three popular strands of arguments against such a reform,
which will be briefly summarised (and answered) below. The first argument says
in essence that there is no real potential for low-productivity job growth in most
European countries because actual vacancy statistics do not indicate an excess
demand for this type of work. In my view, this is a misreading of facts: once po-
tential employers know that welfare state legislation is such that no supply of
(domestic) labour is forthcoming at low wages, they simply do not post
vacancies. In other words: the real test is not whether vacancies are posted today
in the given institutional framework, but whether they would be posted once
wages are low in the relevant segment. To be sure, the experience with low-
productivity job growth in the United States and maybe also the Netherlands is
encouraging in this respect.
The second argument points to the negative 'signalling effect' involved in accept-
ing a low-wage job: once an unemployed person accepts a job with a much lower
1
9 See, i.a., Phelps (1994), Snower (1994).-33-
pay than his/her previously held one, he/she indicates his/her loss of human capi-
tal to potential employers, thus worsening the individual labour market prospects
for the future. In my view, this argument is not convincing either: empirical evi-
dence shows that it is precisely the state of long-term unemployment that is par-
ticularly damaging to one's human capital. While there is hardly any direct com-
parable evidence on whether the 'stigma' is greater in long-term unemployment
than in (possibly temporary) low-wage employment, common sense and casual
observations would clearly suggest that the persistent state of joblessness is
worse. 20
The third strand of arguments concerns more practical issues: subsidising a rela-
tively small part of total employment is somewhat more complicated than provid-
ing benefits to a well-defined group of registered unemployed persons. In this
respect, three issues deserve particular attention: (i) the time horizon of employ-
ment subsidisation and its costs, (ii) the lack of incentives for job change within
the low-wage segment of the labour market, and (iii) the potential for a joint mis-
use by employer and (prospective) employee.
Ad (i): To be a valuable instrument to create a market for low-productivity labour
on unlimited contracts, it is important that the matching grant be given for a long,
preferably an unlimited period of time. On first glance, this seems to imply an
unbearable burden for the government budget because the average length of a
(subsidised) employment spell of a formerly long-term unemployed person should
be many times longer than the average remaining spell of (fully financed) unem-
20 Also, casual exchanges with managers from personnel departments strongly support this
point.-34-
ployment that the person would have otherwise spent in unemployment; what the
government saves in unemployment aid would thus be vastly overcompensated by
what is to be spent on matching grants., However, on second glance, this seem-
ingly plausible argument is largely unfounded because it neglects the incentive to
accept a high-wage job - i.e. a job with a wage above the critical threshold of un-
employment aid - that should work equally in both systems: each (unsubsidised)
job that is attractive enough to leave the state of long-term unemployment is also
attractive enough to leave the state of (subsidised) employment because, by con-
struction of the subsidisation, the reservation wage of the same person is likely to
be the same in both worlds. Only if one were to introduce implausibly high costs
of changing jobs compared to taking up a job after a spell of unemployment (or
some other 'biased' assumption)
2
1 could the above argument claim more than
prima facie plausibility. Hence, if anything, the matching grant scheme is likely to
be the fiscally cheaper system because, at roughly the same number of govern-
ment subsidy recipients, the matching grant per person is lower than the respec-
tive unemployment aid.
Ad (ii): Nevertheless, the matching grant system has a labour allocation problem
of its own within the newly created segment of low-wage labour, i.e. of labour
paid less than the unemployment aid threshold. Competition for low-wage labour
may drive up its market wage and thus open up better-paid, but still low-wage job
slots not only for the still long-term unemployed, who have no free choice any-
For example the assumption that the search intensity of long-term unemployed persons is
higher than that of an already employed person receiving the same net income so that the
latter is less likely to 'notice' the emerging better-paid job opening. Given the notoriously
low search intensity that could be empirically observed for long-term unemployed persons in
the past, this assumption is very implausible indeed.-35-
way, but also for those already employed and receiving a matching grant; how-
ever, these have no pecuniary incentive to change jobs or to bid for higher pay on
the plant level, at least as long as the market wage on offer does not rise above
the wage plus matching grant that they currently receive. In fact, the market only
'works' from the labour demand, not from the labour supply side; and there is no
way how the market could by itself make the subsidy burden shrink.
There are basically two potential (non-exclusive) ways out of this problem. The
first and probably most fool-proof way is to make the paying of the matching
grant contingent upon the readiness of the subsidised employee to accept any
better-paid job (and conversely to reject any worse-paid job) or alternatively to
negotiate a higher wage with the current employer. Practically, this could be done
by leaving the subsidised employees registered at the public job centres, subject-
ing them to an analogous code of acceptability as the unemployed, and possibly
authorising private commercial employment agencies to watch the labour market
for superior low-wage job alternatives open to the subsidised employees. The
second way would be to give low-wage employees a stronger search incentive,
e.g., by reducing the matching grant by less than the realised wage gain. How-
ever, such a strategy has its natural limits because it also gives some 'perverse'
incentives: it would become attractive to deliberately start with the worst-paid job
and then move up by job changes so as to 'privatise' part of the self-created po-
tential for social gains; and after such a 'privatisation', there would also be an un-
welcome incentive to stay in the range of subsidised employment instead of
searching for unsubsidised jobs above the unemployment-aid threshold. This is
why the private gains would have to remain within reasonably narrow bounds and
allowed to accrue only for a very limited period of time, say, a few months after a
job change.-36-
Ad (iii): There is the possibility of a cartelisation of potential employer and em-
ployee at the expense of the government: in private arrangements, they may agree
to set the wage below the person's marginal product so as to maximise the share
of the person's income that is covered by the matching grant. Again, the remedy
lies in the competitive bidding for low wage labour from the demand side: if, for
whatever reason, an employer/employee-cartel sets the wage well below the mar-
ket level, then it is very likely that better-paid job offers for the respective em-
ployee will emerge in due course and push the wage up again, thus leading back
to the solvable problem of making subsidised labour move from worse to better
paid jobs (see (ii) above).
Similarly, it has been argued - and allegedly supported by empirical evidence -
that there tend to be large dead-weight losses involved in employment subsidy
schemes because, typically, a large part of all employers who cash in subsidies
for hiring long-term unemployed persons would have hired them anyway; in the
same vein, there is supposed to be a strong substitution effect in the sense that
employers have an incentive to replace unsubsidised workers by subsidised ones,
thus in effect reducing labour costs at the expense of the taxpayer without
increasing employment.
2
2 Even if one were to accept this empirical evidence,
which is mostly based on rather small-scale case studies with many conceptual
problems, it is hard to see how the mischief could be more than a short-run
problem within our matching grant system: if, as the evidence seems to suggest,
long-term unemployed persons are after all relatively good substitutes for
2
2 See the survey on various empirical studies of employment subsidy schemes in OECD
Employment Outlook (1993), pp.63-4.-37-
employed workers, then competitive pressures will push up their wages in the
way described above and thus reduce the extent of subsidisation.-38-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: 1920-38,1950-89 Maddison (1991), pp. 262-5, Table C.6; 1990-94 OECD Employment Outlook 1995, p. 216, Table 1.-40-
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